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Paul Crowther, in his book, The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art, 1 
has worked to reconstruct Kant's aesthetics in order to make it more co­
herent, more plausible, and thereby more relevant to contemporary aes­
thetic concerns. Crowther's reconstruction is intended to sidestep Kant's 
specific metaphysics and epistemology, but still benefit from Kant's in­
sights into our appreciation for the sublime. Within the framework of 
this reconstructed Kantian aesthetics, he lays out four basic varieties of 
the sublime in art: the "cognitive" sublime, the "artefoctual" sublime, the 
"personalized" sublime, and the "expressive" sublime. 2 The first of these va­
rieties, the "cognitive" sublime, differs from the other three in that it is 
the closest to Kant's original formulation of the sublime, and in that it 
resides in nature as much as it does in art. The remaining three varieties, 
however, are specifically artistic strains of the sublime, and are extensions -
new varieties - that Crowther adds to Kant's original exposition of the 
sublime. 
My goal here3 will be to remain (for the most part) within the area 
covered by Crowther's "cognitive" sublime - the sublime in its more tra­
ditional Kantian sense - to show that, even while remaining within this 
(as it were) "pure" area, there is much space for expanding upon Kant's 
examples and varieties of the sublime, particularly in art. The idea here 
will not be to refute Crowther's new varieties, but to show how, before 
Paul Crowther, The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989). 
2 Crowther, The Kantian Sublime, Part III, Ch. 7,152-174. 
3 This piece was presented in an earlier form as "Kantian Varieties of the Artistic 
Sublime", delivered at the "(Re)Discovering Aesthetics" Conference in Cork, Ire­
land Guly 9-11,2004), on Sunday, July 11, and utilizes material from my doc­
toral dissertation, C. E. Emmer, Possibilities for a Non-Ocular Aesthetics in Kant's 
"Critique of Judgment" (New York: Stony Brook Universiry, 2002), in particular 
Chapters IV and V. References to Kant's Critique of Judgment [Kritik der Urteil­
skraftJ (1790) will provide the German abbreviation (KU) and will provide the 
section number, usually followed by the page number from vol. V of the "Aka­
demie-Ausgabe". As a guide to the English, I have referred to the Pluhar transla­
tion: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). 
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we venture beyond more strictly Kantian borders into what Crowther 
calls "specifically artistic,,4 varieties of the sublime, there is already 
much rich territory for exploration. 
My own explorations of this territory originated in questions about 
the role of the senses in Kant's mature aesthetics.5 Searching for answers 
to those questions revealed that, although Kant's mature aesthetics does 
express a pronounced preference for sight over the other "objective" 
senses (particularly in the case of touch), a more self-consistent recon­
struction of his aesthetics would allow much more space for the other 
"objective" senses (hearing and touch)6 to serve as conduits for the beau­
tiful and the sublime in their Kantian varieties - certain unavoidable dis-
4 The phrase "specifically artistic" appears e. g. on p. 154 of The Kantian Sublime. 
5 Some of this work has been published as C. E. Emmer, "The Senses of the Sub­
lime", in Kant und die Berliner Aujlkliirung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant­
Kongresses, ed. by Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumach­
er (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), Vol. 3, 512-518. 
6 I am here using Kant's distinction - from his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point 
of View [Anthropologie in pragmatischer Himichtl (179811800), Akademie-Ausgabe 
Vol. VII -between the "objective" senses (sight, hearing, and touch), which relate 
to the cognition of physical objects, and the "subjective" senses (taste and smell) 
which refer to sensual, chemical, and intimate relationships which have no objec­
tive content (see § 16 of the Anthropology, AA 07: 153-154). Kant's own pref­
erence for sight over hearing and touch, and these above smell and taste, has a 
long line of precursors; see for example Plato's praise for sight in the Timaeus 
(where sight has pride of place over hearing in revealing the divine cosmic 
order, but touch receives no such distinction), or Aristotle's discussion of the 
senses in the Nicomachean Ethics at ii, 10 (1118al -1118b 7) and x, 5 
(1176al-4). On the other hand, however, one cannot ascribe a monolithic pref­
erence for sight to the history of philosophy, since some periods have rested on a 
challenge to that preference. Some examples include the ancient atomists and sto­
ics (favoring touch), the Lutheran arrack on the oculocentric "theology of glory" 
(favoring hearing, a theme later adopted to a certain degree by the romantics and 
Heidegger), and the modern empiricists and materialists, who reduce all senses to 
touch (even the "rationalist" Descartes does so in his Dioptrics). Aristotle himself 
remarks on this haptocentrism in regard to the Presocratics: " Democritus and the 
majority of natural philosophers who discuss perception are guilty of a great ab­
surdity; for they represent all perception as being by touch" from De Semu (4: 
442a29), cited in Raven Kirk and Schofield (eds.), The Presocratic Philosophers, 
2nd ed., updated bibliography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 428. On Luther's critique of the "theology of glory", see John van 
Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the hidden king (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), and John van Buren, "Martin Heidegger, Martin Lu­
ther", in: Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (eds.), Reading Heidegger from 
the Start: Essays in his earliest thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 159-174. 
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advantages to touch notwithstanding.? At the same time, these explora­
tions led me to a number of observations that I hope to be able to 
bring to bear presently on the question of the Kantian sublime in art. 
I should say at the outset that, in general, I find Crowther's work in 
his The Kantian Sublime very congenial. Crowther manages to give Kant's 
theory a sympathetic but nonetheless perceptive and critical reading, a re­
construction which argues for the continued relevance of Kant's theory. 
In addition, Crowther is very good at anticipating possible fields of ap­
plication for his reconstruction, leaving us with a reading that promises 
many avenues of further exploration in the field of human artifice.8 
With these in mind, what I would like to do in this piece, then, is simply 
make sure that additional possible areas of exploration for the Kantian 
sublime (also within the artistic realm) are not overlooked. 
Let us then quickly review Crowther's basic approach and results. The 
last part of his book, part III, which deals with questions of the artistic 
sublime, is divided into two chapters. The first chapter of part III is de­
voted to his reconstruction of Kant's understanding of the aesthetic,9 and 
the second chapter of part III provides the expanded varieties of the sub­
lime he is able to generate on the basis of this reconstruction. Specifically, 
in the first chapter of Part III (Ch. 6), Crowther is concerned (as previ­
ously mentioned) to ensure that we do not allow an uncritical dedication 
to a 'history of ideas' approach to trap us in weaknesses in Kant's theory 
of faculties, and so develops a reconstructed Kantian theory that does not 
depend upon reference to the faculties. In addition, he wants to move 
away from what he sees as the unfortunate and limiting centrality of 
the moral to Kant's idea of the sublime. This reconstruction turns on a 
7 For most of the history of philosophical discussion of beauty, preference has gone 
to sight (and, to a lesser degree, to hearing) over touch. Given the usual criteria in 
question (complexity, clarity, and in a cenain sense, stability), these privileges for 
sight (and, to a lesser degree, hearing) are justified. In Kant's case, his conception 
of beauty privileges complex forms, and this preference places touch at an un­
avoidable disadvantage, particularly since a certain level of complexity appears 
to touch merely as texture, not form. Nonetheless, in my dissenation I argued 
for cenain restricted conditions under which touch could serve as a conduit 
for beautiful form, and also for acoustic and haptic conduits for the occasion 
for the sublime (some of which will be briefly discussed below). 
8 Crowther's reconstruction also offers a ready tool for the use of critics and artists. 
9 The "aesthetic" will always refer in this paper to Kant's aesthetics (his theory of 
beauty, sublimity, and art) as laid out in the KU, and not to his "transcendental 
aesthetic" (or theory of pure sensibility) of the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der 
reinen Vernunftl . 
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broader definition of the aesthetic that jettisons Kant's "moments" of ne­
cessity and universality and retains only the elements of disinterestedness 
and subjective purposiveness (the felt harmony of the cognitive faculties). 
Crowther argues that, ultimately, this combination better shows how 
both the beautiful and the sublime are aesthetic. 10 
Within this new, Kant-inspired framework, then, in the second chap­
ter of Part III (Ch. 7), Crowther provides us with four basic varieties of 
the sublime: what he calls the "cognitive" sublime, the "artefoctual" sub­
lime, the "personalized" sublime, and the "expressive" sublime. To summa­
rIze: 
• Crowther's "cognitive" sublime essentially turns on the same occasions 
for the sublime as Kant's mathematical and dynamical sublime - ob­
jects, whether natural or man-made, which serve as occasions for the 
feeling of the sublime due to their suggestion of infinite size or 
power. II The remaining three of Crowther's varieties of the sublime, 
as mentioned before, are found only in art, and so are "specifically ar­
tistic" varieties of the sublime, not merely varieties of the sublime 
which happen to (also) have artistic locations. 
• Crowther's "artefoctual" sublime refers to sublime-like feelings that are 
occasioned by great works of human productivity, a recognition (or 
"realization") of the great scope of human productive ability - in his 
words, "an authentic astonishment at what human creativity can ach­
ieve". Crowther refers to Kant's example of St. Peter's Cathedral in 
Rome, pointing out that, though it may occasion the "cognitive" sub­
lime, it may also be the occasion for the "artefactual" sublime - not 
simply focusing on the building's impressive command of space, but 
its testament to the power of human capacities to physically transform 
the world. Crowther mentions a particularly striking example of this 
recognition in the sort of clear awe at the power and sweep of capital­
ism in transforming the entire earth that one finds for example in 
Zola's novel Germinal. 12 
10 See Pan III, chapter 6 of The Kantian Sublime, 139 -15l. 
11 He explicitly names it as such on p. 162 of The Kantian Sublime. 
12 The Kantian Sublime, 153 (due to what must be an oversight, it is listed as "ar­
tifactual" sublime in the index). For the remarks on the power of capital, see 
163-165 - I think Crowther's remarks hold especially of the discussion of the 
power of capital found in the Communist Manifesto (he does mention "the images 
and sentiments used in and aroused by the political writings of Marx, Bakunin, 
and others" at p. 164). Compare Edmund Burke's discussion of "difficulty" in his 
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• Crowther's "personalized" sublime also refers to a recognition of the 
"scope of artistic creation", but in this case in an artistic product 
that has especially personal significance for the person appreciating it 
(this variety of the sublime is thus the furthest from Kant's idea of uni­
versality).13 
• Crowther's "expressive" sublime refers to an artist's ability to "[penetrate 
a simple human truth] so effectively [that we are immersed] in associ­
ations pertaining to this particular instance of it". 14 In the "expressive" 
sublime, the power of an artist to effectively capture an aspect of 
human reality strikes us in a particularly forceful way. (T his is closer 
to Kant's idea of genius.) 15 
In all of these, then, there is still in common with Kant's sublime (or the 
"cognitive" sublime) a recognition of the power of some human capacity, 
albeit in each case a more specific capacity than that involved in the "cog­
nitive" sublime - say, the power of the human race as a whole to trans­
form the earth and its elements, or the power of a particular artist to 
touch or move us personally. 
In my own attempts to correct for Kant's tendencies to overemphasize 
sight (or, conversely, his tendencies to underestimate the possibilities for 
the other senses) in his treatments of both the beautiful and the sublime, I 
arrived at a number of new varieties of the Kantian sublime that turned 
on these neglected senses. Again, I should re-emphasize that, here, the va­
rieties in question would all fall under what Crowther calls the "cogni­
tive" sublime - that sublime which rests on reflection on the human sub­
ject's rational capacities (as spectator), and therefore not "specifically artis­
tic" varieties of the sublime. To put it in other words, I will here be look­
ing to that part of Crowther's discussion that does not explicitly add to 
Kant's varieties of the sublime, so that I can show where further possibil­
ities for the sublime overlooked by Crowther might be considered. Brief­
ly, these varieties can be organized according to whether (on the one 
hand) the dynamically sublime or the mathematical sublime is in ques-
A Philosophical Equiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
(1757/1759), Part II, Section XII. 
13 The Kantian Sublime, 158. 
14 The Kantian Sublime, 159. 
15 Crowther himself puts this relation to genius in terms of "follow[ingl up a [ . . . J 
clue provided by Kant" ( The Kantian Sublime, 158), namely, Kant's discussion of 
the aesthetic idea - "material for a harmony of reason and imagination which 
could have led Kant to a distinctively artistic notion of the sublime linked to gen­
ius. But he does not thus develop it" (159). 
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tion, and (on the other hand) what particular "objective" sense is the ave­
nue for the occasion for the sublime. 16 
For example, when considering the dynamically sublime, one might 
think of the acoustic varieties of the dynamically sublime which Kant 
has passed over in his discussions of the sublime. I? Hearing the sounds 
of a pounding storm from inside a house or the power of a waterfall's 
rushing roar heard from a bridge provide acoustic analogs for the sight 
of those powerful natural phenomena which we see at a distance, from 
a safe place. Likewise, one might apprehend the vibrations of the power­
ful rumble of a volcano or the crushing power of an avalanche at a dis­
tance through the sense of touch. 
In a similar manner, one can imagine acoustic avenues for the math­
ematically sublime. These are more varied. In particular there is what I 
call the "acoustic estimation of magnitude" (involving such things as ech­
oes in canyons or the sounds of objects falling into deep crevices) and 
what I call the "acoustic infinite", which involves an impression of infin­
ity from attention to the silence out of which sounds emerge (though I am 
perhaps more skeptical about this variety than when I first formulated it, 
mainly because I now incline to think that, on the one hand, space may 
be more powerfully felt in hearing distant, mediated sound, than in si­
lence, and that, on the other hand, silence is apprehended more as an op­
pressive plenum than as an empty space). 
In addition, one might posit what I have called "autosublimity" - ar­
riving at the feeling of the sublime without having a vast or powerful ob­
ject physically before us. Crowther comes close to suggesting this when he 
mentions the possible sublimity of a mirage: 
[5] uppose that while in the desert we experience a mirage of a vast mountain 
range and that this encounter is experienced in terms of a feeling of sublim­
ity. Suppose also that we then become aware that the mountain range is, in 
fact, a mirage. Would this discovery have any bearing on the grounds of our 
pleasure? In the strictest sense, it ought not to. For the scope of rational cog-
16 I discuss these varieties in more detail in "The Senses of the Sublime", in Kant 
und die Berliner Aufkliirung: Aktm des IX. Internationalm Kant-Kongresses, 
cited above. 
17 Granted, Burke's empiricist theory discusses acoustic avenues for the sublime, 
such as regular cannon shots or the oppressive sound of crowds and marching 
bands, but the question here is whether Kant - not Burke - has overlooked 
acoustic varieties of the sublime (for Kant, of course, Burke's examples would 
not be, properly speaking, sublime, since they turn on active fear). 
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nition can be 'realized' just as much by the appearance of vastness and power, 
as it can by the vastness or power of a real object. 18 
I basically agree with Crowther on this point, though my thought experi­
ments have dealt more with imagined objects than illusory or hallucinated 
ones. And, as it so turns out, though it is not necessary to have such con­
ditions, this imaginary sublime or "aurosublimity" often arises in us when 
we have a small, physically unpowerful object before us (I will return to 
this idea presently) .  
Let me talk a bit more about Crowther's "cognitive" sublime. One 
might be confused by Crowther's discussion of the "cognitive" sublime 
and "artefacrual" sublime - taking them both to be art-related - because 
the "cognitive" sublime can also be found in artworks.19 One has to re­
member that occasions for the "cognitive" sublime are found both in art­
works and in nature, so that its turning on art is contingent, and not "spe­
cifically artistic". However, when discussing the "cognitive" sublime in its 
artistic manifestations, it should be noted that Crowther mentions (but 
does not truly thematize) the fact that the "cognitive" sublime (whether 
mathematical or dynamical) can be either a sublimity hinging on the 
art object itself or a sublimity hinging on its subject matter. In other 
words, the sublime in art can be either instantiated in the art object or rep- . 
resented by it. I like to call these alternatives the "embodied" and "depict­
ed" sublime.20 
This distinction - between the "embodied" and "depicted" sublime­
is also touched upon, though not named in this way, by Crowther in his 
18 The Kantian Sublime, 149 (he immediately mentions the connection to represen­
tations of occasions for the sublime in art - as opposed to sublime representa­
tions). 
19 There is also the fact, to which I myself initially fell prey, that Crowther discusses 
his varieties of the sublime at length without naming them all, and only fully 
christens them when he summarizes them at p. 162. For example, the "artefac­
tual" sublime is first clearly defined on p. 153, but not named as such until p. 
162. This delay in clearly naming his varieties of the sublime could lead to con­
fusion. As was mentioned before, Crowther himself discusses another possible 
source of confusion, namely, the fact that the varieties of the sublime do not 
mark out separate classes of objects - one and the same object could be the oc­
casion for the "cognitive" sublime and the "artefacrual" sublime (153) - though I 
do not believe he himself remarks specifically on its possibility to confuse. 
20 One important caveat here: as Kant points out, the object itself is, technically 
speaking, never sublime. Therefore, when I use the term, "embodied" sublime, 
this only means that the aspects which serve as the occasion for the sublime are 
embodied; not the sublime itself. 
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discussion of the artefactual sublime. He gives the example of science fic­
tion movies where great expanses of space and technology are served up -
depicted - to the viewer in an awe-inspiring spectacle.21 Examples of this 
(epic or science-fictional) depicted sublime have only increased since 
Crowther's book came OUt.22 
Crowther's central examples of what I am calling the "embodied" 
sublime are also Kant's: Saint Peter's Cathedral, the pyramids, etc., all 
of which are human productions. Though, technically, the natural sub­
lime is also (almost by definition) an "embodied" sublime, it is precisely 
because of this almost unavoidable embodiment that the word means 
much less in the natural context. In the realm of art, the sublime need 
not be embodied, for (as has been pointed out) in art the sublime can 
also be depicted. These examples are all architectural; but we might 
pause, briefly, to consider one example of a non-architectural type. 
A particularly striking contemporary example of the embodied sub­
lime in its dynamic mode might be found in the work of Richard 
Serra, which (in one phase of his work) generally consist of large plates 
of metal that are sometimes leaned against each other in such a way 
that they are free-standing constructions. Structurally, some are not un­
like the houses of cards people build on their coffee tables, only that Ser­
ra's works are on a much greater scale and are very heavy. His works al­
most inevitably pull the viewer into comparing their physical presence 
to that of the sculpture, to size themselves up against it. Given his 
work's great size and weight, one can tell that it almost insists upon 
being taken as an occasion for the sublime, particularly the dynamically 
sublime. Famously (or infamously), his sculptures have twice (1972 and 
21 The Kantian Sublime, 165. Crowmer also discusses what I am calling the "depict­
ed" sublime on p. 155 ("Kant now [Sc. III the example of the inscription upon the 
temple of Isis at KU § 23] clearly concedes that representational artworks can 
have a content or subject-matter which in itself is in some sense sublime".) 
and pp. 160-161 (where Crowmer distinguishes between sublimity of expres­
sion and sublimity of content). 
22 Again, as noted earlier (and by Crowmer himself), the very same object which 
serves as the occasion for this "arrefacrual" sublime could also serve as the occa­
sion for a depicted "cognitive" sublime. One could simply attend to the great size 
or power of these depicted things, as opposed to their production by human be­
ings. (One might additionally distinguish between being impressed with the film­
makers' ability to produce cinematic spectacles of such awesome scope or being 
impressed with the human creative power present in the fictive world of the 
film. In this distinction, it should be noted, we seem to have the distinction be­
tween "embodied" and "depicted" sublimity itself elevated to a meta-level.) 
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1981) fallen and injured or killed workers in the process of installing or 
de-installing them.23 Especially with this knowledge, would not the over­
whelming - possibly fatal - power of these pieces attest to their embodi­
ment of the dynamical sublime ?24 
The "depicted" sublime, on the other hand, is a "specifically artistic" 
mode of the sublime, and I would like to end my paper with a few ob­
servations on "specifically artistic" varieties of the sublime, or at least va­
rieties of the sublime which approach the "specifically artistic", since that 
was the realm which Crowther could count most justifiably as his special 
extension of Kant's considerations of the sublime. 
Staying with the "depicted" sublime for a moment: I mentioned be­
fore that the occasion for "autosublimity" (the sublime in the absence of a 
vast or powerful object physically before us) often happened to occur 
when we have a small, physically unpowerful object before us. Granted, 
ultimately "autosublimity" leads to a sublime encountered in the absence 
of any object before us at all - a purely internal or imaginary occasion for 
the sublime. Nonetheless, in its less extreme forms, "autosublimity" is 
usually occasioned by art objects, and it seems to me, literary ones in par­
ticular. At the very least, this seems to be the occasion which was most 
vital to Kant himself! It has always struck me that most of the examples 
of the sublime which Kant discusses (whether in nature or art) seem to 
have been delivered to him while reading books in the confines of his 
room. At one place he not only mentions sublime descriptions of natural 
23 I do not mean co disparage Serra's work, ability, or intentions by mentioning 
these incidents. In at least one of the cwo cases, it was ruled that worker incom­
petence was involved (one worker was illiterate and was therefore unable co fol­
low the written instructions for handling the piece) - this according co the sum­
mary in Lynn Powers, Killer Art: Art that Has Maimed, Killed, or Caused General. 
Destruction through the Centuries (New Orleans: Pontalba Press, 1999), 33-34. 
Powers' work, the only printed source I was able co access by the time of writing, 
is not an especially scholarly book; it is more of a sensationalist coffee-table pro­
duction (it fulfills its function as a conversation piece admirably well, however). 
Her sources are Don Terry, "A 16-Ton Sculpture Falls, Injuring 2", The New York 
Times October 27, 1988, section II, p. 1, col. 3, and Career Ratcliff, "Making 
Truly Dangerous Art", Newsday December 9, 1988, 92. Powers also discusses 
the 1991 incident in which one of Oavacheff] Chrisco's umbrellas from his 
piece, The Umbrellas: Joint Piece for Japan and USA, was blown over and killed 
an onlooker, but Chrisco's Umbrellas (at least, judging from photographs) do not 
seem to have the aesthetic effect of power; rather, they look more decorative than 
imposing. 
24 My discussion of Serra here is lifted wholesale from my doccoral dissertation, Pos­
sibilities for a Non-Ocular Aesthetics in Kant's "Critique of Judgment'� 
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phenomena, but states that the charge of the sublime is carried in the 
books themselves. Indeed, given that it is carried in books, Kant goes 
so far as to say that the sublime can actually be purchased: 
In fact that which we, prepared through culture, call sublime, seems merely 
repellant to a person untutored in the development of moral ideas. [ ... ] 
Thus (as Mr. [Horace Benedict] de Saussure relates) the good, and further­
more reasonable, Savoyard peasant called without pause all lovers of gla­
ciered mountains fools. Who knows if he would not be unjustified, had 
our reporter [sc. Saussure] taken on these dangers [ ... ] merely [00.] for 
sport? But, in point of fact, his intention was the instruction of humanity, 
and that excellent man in addition got and provided the soul-elevatin� sen­
sation [sc. the sublime] to the readers of his travels in their purchase. 5 
25 [In der That wird ohne Entwickeiung sittiicher Ideen das, was wir, durch Cuitur vor­
bereitet, erhaben nennen, dem rohen Memchen bioI abschreckend vorkommen. [oo.J 
So nannte der gute, ubrigem verstandige savonische Bauer (wie Hr. v. 5aussure er­
ziihit) aLLe Liebhaber der Eisgebirge ohne Bedenken Narren. Wer wei! auch, ob er 
so ganz Unrecht gehabt hatte, wenn jener Beobachter die Gefohren [ ... J bioI [ . . .  J 
aus Liebhaberei [oo.J ubernommen hatte? So aber war seine Absicht Beiehrung der 
Memchen; und die seeienerhebende Empfindung hatte und gab der vortrefJliche 
Mann den Lesern seiner Reisen in ihrem Kauf oben ein.J KU § 29, AA 05: 265 
(translation mine, turning on Pluhar). 
I bristle at Robin Schott's contention that Kant's moral philosophy reduces 
human worth to market values. She writes that Kant's moral philosophy 
"mak[esJ normative the objectifying social relations between persons and things 
that are generated in a world ruled by commodiry production [oo.J. Not only 
[does Kant's moral lawJ borrow its content from bourgeois sociery; the very for­
malism of the moral law reflects the phenomenon of reification" [Cognition and 
Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), x-xi and 
143). Her interpretation of Kant's moral theory seems to run counter to the very 
idea of the categorical imperative (especially in the formula of the "end in it­
self"), namely, that one should never treat people merely as things (see the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der SittenJ , 
AA 04: 428) - indeed, Kant himself specifically rules out a reduction to market 
values: "That which relates to general human inclinations and needs has a market 
price [00.] that, however, which constitutes the determination under which alone 
something can be an end in itself, has not merely a relative worth, i. e., a price, 
but rather an intrinsic worth, i. e., digniry" [Was sich auf die aLLgemeinen memchli­
chen Neigungen und Bedurfoisse bezieht, hat einen Marktpreis [ . . .  ) das aber, was die 
Bedingung ausmacht, unter den allein etwas Zweck an sich seibst sein kann, hat nicht 
bioI einen relativen Werth, d.i. einen Preis, sondern einen inner Werth, d.i. Wurde) 
(my translation, Kant's emphasis, GMS, AA 04: 434-435). Nonetheless, in 
Kant's discussion of "purchasing" the sublime, we have a passage of loose speech 
(perhaps overlooked by Schott) that could bolster her case. Technically, of course, 
Kant could only say that one can purchase the occasion for the sublime. 
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Crowther lays aside the universal import of the sublime in his reconstruc­
tion, but in the idea of "autosublimity" there might still be a remnant of 
that import in the universal referent of reason in all humans upon which 
"autosublimity" ultimately rests. 
Whether we want to call this depicted "autosublimity" a "specif ically 
artistic" variety of the sublime or not, I should end with a variety of the 
sublime which is "specifically artistic", namely what we might call the 
"symbolic" sublime. (Here we are definitively leaving what could be sit­
uated under Crowther's "cognitive" sublime.) In a wonderful discussion 
of Kant's theory of art, entitled "Form and Content in Kant's Aesthetics", 
Kirk Pillow clarifies the distinct roles of the beautiful and the sublime in 
art for Kant.26 Though there is no space here to lay out his argument for 
this thesis, his thesis itself can be summarized in the following way: 
though it may seem that Kant's discussion of art mixes or confuses the 
beautiful and the sublime, what is in fact at heart in his account is 
that, in the greatest art, sublime content is expressed in beautiful form. 
This assertion deserves to be repeated: sublime content is expressed in 
beautiful form. In other words, taste forms or exhibits the content or 
"matter" supplied by the (artistic) genius. This sublime content might 
sound like another case of the depicted sublime, but (as Pillow himself 
points out) it is not. The sublime content in question is not the depiction 
26 Kirk Pillow, "Form and Content in Kant's Aesthetics: Locating Beauty and the 
Sublime in the Work of Art", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 32.3 
Ouly 1994): 443-459, later developed into part of his book, Sublime Under­
standing: Aesthetic Reflection in Kant and Hegel (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 2000). As he puts it, "with some adjustments to Kant's theory, one can in­
terpret judgments of taste and of sublimity as forming rwo distinct but intimately 
related moments or stages of reflection on art" (Sublime Understanding, 92) - in 
other words, the mental state aroused by the artwork's inviting beautiful form 
prepares one for the sublimity of its aesthetic ideas (see "Form and Content in 
Kant's Aesthetics"). In 1995 Robert Wicks observed that in the Kantian theory 
"the combination of genius and taste necessary for the best art calls for a delicate 
alliance berween artistic sublimity and artistic beauty" in his "Kant on Fine Art: 
Artistic Sublimity Shaped by Beauty", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
53.2 (Spring 1995): 189-93, here 192. This, what might be called the "combi­
nation thesis", has also appeared in a recent theological piece critical of Kant's 
theory of the sublime and its reappropriation by postmodernists: "The greatest 
service of beauty, however, is that it makes room, through conceptual repose, 
for the imaginative mediation of reason and its supersensible ideas". John R. 
Betz, "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part 
One)", Modern Theology 21.3 Ouly 2005): 367-411, here 379-380. 
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of sublime subject matter,27 but rather the unbounded character of the aes­
thetic ideas, an unbounded character which carries with it the suggestion 
of infinity. 28 In this, then, we have finally a "specifically artistic" sublime, 
what we might call the "symbolic" sublime, in a central point of Kant's 
theory of art, namely, the aesthetic idea. (Kant's exposition, it is true, ob­
scures the primarily sublime import of the aesthetic idea, but Kirk Pillow's 
careful work has retrieved it.) 
With this, then, I hope to have shown that many unexplored possi­
bilities for a Kantian sublime in art can be found even within the 
range covered by Crowther's "cognitive" sublime. In addition, with the 
idea of the "symbolic" sublime, a further, "specifically artistic" sublime 
can be found.29 
27 The depiction of (traditionally) sublime subject matter and, likewise, what Kant 
refers to as "aesthetic attributes" [iisthetische Attribute) (KU § 49, AA 05: 315), is 
something Crowther sees as also problematic; Crowther worries that sublime 
subject matter can easily degenerate into cliched conventions which, due to 
their hackneyed nature, will no longer be able to evoke a feeling of the sublime 
( The Kantian Sublime, 155 and 161). 
28 Crowther discusses something analogous to this in his "expressive" sublime: "if a 
concept is embodied in an aesthetic idea, this can lead the imagination to try and 
grasp a sense of the innumerable torality of the instances which form the exten­
sion of that concept" (159). The difference however is that, for Pillow, what is 
involved is a feeling of the mind's own expansion in the observer, and thus the 
unlimited quality of the human mind itself, whereas Crowther's expressive sub­
lime involves feeling the power of the human mind through recognizing the 
power of the artist's mind (since the "expressive" sublime is a sott of wonder at 
the expressive power of the artist). 
29 A chart summarizing the varieties of the sublime discussed here can be accessed at 
the following URL: <http://www.sensus-communis.com/�emmerlsublime/ 
chart.html>. 
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